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ABSTRACT
A barrier certificate can separate the state space of a con-
sidered hybrid system (HS) into safe and unsafe parts ac-
cording to the safety property to be verified. Therefore this
notion has been widely used in the verification of HSs. A
stronger condition on barrier certificates means that less
expressive barrier certificates can be synthesized. On the
other hand, synthesizing more expressive barrier certificates
often means high complexity. In [9], Kong et al consid-
ered how to relax the condition of barrier certificates while
still keeping their convexity so that one can synthesize more
expressive barrier certificates efficiently using semi-definite
programming (SDP). In this paper, we first discuss how to
relax the condition of barrier certificates in a general way,
while still keeping their convexity. Particularly, one can then
utilize different weaker conditions flexibly to synthesize dif-
ferent kinds of barrier certificates with more expressiveness
efficiently using SDP. These barriers give more opportuni-
ties to verify the considered system. We also show how to
combine two functions together to form a combined barrier
certificate in order to prove a safety property under consid-
eration, whereas neither of them can be used as a barrier
certificate separately, even according to any relaxed condi-
tion. Another contribution of this paper is that we discuss
how to discover certificates from the general relaxed condi-
tion by SDP. In particular, we focus on how to avoid the
unsoundness because of numeric error caused by SDP with
symbolic checking.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.3.1 [Specifying and Verifying and Reasoning about
Programs]: Invariants
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
Inductive invariant, barrier certificate, safety verification,
hybrid system, nonlinear system, sum of squares
1. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems make use of computer units to control
physical devices so that the behavior of the controlled de-
vices meets expected requirements. They have become ubiq-
uitous in our modern life. How to design correct embedded
systems is a grand challenge for computer science and con-
trol theory. Model-driven development (MDD) is considered
as an effective way of developing correct complex embedded
systems, and has been successfully applied in industry [6,
12]. In the framework of MDD, a formal model of the system
to be developed is defined at the beginning; then extensive
analysis and verification are conducted based on the formal
model so that errors can be detected and corrected at the
very early stage of the design of the system. Afterwards,
model transformation techniques are applied to transform
the abstract formal model into lower level models, even into
source code. Hybrid systems (HSs) combine discrete mode
changes with continuous evolutions specified in the form of
differential equations. With mathematically precise seman-
tics, HSs can serve as an appropriate model of embedded
systems [14, 2].
In the past, analysis and verification of HSs are mainly done
through directly computing reachable sets, either by model-
checking (e.g., [1, 22, 7]) or by decision procedures (e.g.,
[11]). The basic idea is to partition the state space of a con-
sidered system into finite many equivalent classes, or repre-
sent to finite many computable sets according to the solu-
tions of the ODEs of the system. Since there is only a very
small class of ODEs with closed form solutions, the scalabil-
ity of these approaches is very restricted, only applicable to
very specific linear HSs. To deal with more complicated sys-
tems, a deductive method has been recently proposed and
successfully applied in practice [17, 18]. The most challeng-
ing part of a deductive method is how to discover invariants,
which hold at all reachable states of the system. For techni-
cal reason, people only consider how to synthesize inductive
invariants, which are preserved by all discrete and contin-
uous transitions. In general, a safety property itself is an
invariant, but not an inductive invariant. Obviously, an in-
ductive invariant is an approximation of the reachable set,
which may be discovered according to the ODEs, rather than
their solutions. The basic idea is as follows: first, predefine
a property template (linear or non-linear, depending on the
property to be verified); then, encode the conditions of a
property to be inductive (discretely and/or continuously)
into some constraints on state variables and parameters; fi-
nally, find out solutions to the constraints. So, how to define
inductiveness conditions and the power of constraint solving
are essential in these approaches.
Many approaches have been proposed following the line dis-
cussed above. E.g., in [8, 23], the authors independently
proposed different approaches for constructing inductive in-
variants for linear HSs; S. Sankaranarayanan et al presented
a computational method to automatically generate algebraic
invariants for algebraic HSs in [24, 25], based on the theory
of pseudo-ideal over polynomial ring and quantifier elimina-
tion; S. Prajna in [19, 20] provided a new notion of inductive
invariants called barrier certificates for verifying the safety
of semi-algebraic HSs with stochastic setting using the tech-
nique of sum-of-squares (SOS); while in [17], Platzer and
Clarke extended the idea of barrier certificates by consid-
ering boolean combinations of multiple polynomial inequal-
ities; In [4, 27], S. Gulwani et al investigated how to gener-
ate inductive invariants with more expressiveness for semi-
algebraic HSs by relaxing the inductiveness conditions by
considering inductiveness on the boundaries of predefined
invariant templates; while in [13], Liu et al considered how
to further relax the inductiveness condition given in [4, 27]
and first gave a complete method on how to generate semi-
algebraic invariants for semi-algebraic HSs. In [26], C. Solth
at el proposed an approach to constructing global inductive
invariant from local differential invariants using optimiza-
tion technique.
The aforementioned approaches can be classified into two
categories: symbolic computation based approaches like [8,
23, 24, 25, 17, 4, 27, 13], and numeric computation based
approaches like [19, 20, 26]. In general, the former can syn-
thesize more expressive invariants, but their efficiencies are
very low; in contrast, the efficiency of the latter is very high,
normally in polynomial time as only SDP is used, but the
expressiveness of synthesized invariants is restrictive. In [9],
Kong et al investigated how to synthesize more expressive
barrier certificates by proposing exponential barrier certifi-
cate condition, which is a relaxed inductiveness condition,
but still keeps the convexity of barrier certificates. There-
fore, more expressive barrier certificates can be synthesized
efficiently according to their condition still by SDP.
In this paper, firstly, following Kong et al’s line, in the pre-
requisite of keeping the convexity of barrier certificates so
that SDP is still applicable, we discuss how to relax the con-
dition of barrier certificates in a general way. Thus, one can
utilize different weaker conditions flexibly to synthesize dif-
ferent kinds of barrier certificates with more expressiveness
efficiently, which gives more opportunities to verify the con-
sidered system. In addition, we consider how to combine two
functions together to form a combined barrier certificate to
prove a safety property under consideration, whereas neither
of these two functions can be used as a barrier certificate sep-
arately, even according to any relaxed conditions. Another
contribution of this paper is that we design algorithms to
synthesize barrier certificates according to the general re-
laxed condition by SDP. In particular, we focus on how to
avoid the unsoundness of our approach caused by numerical
errors in SDP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 in-
troduces some basic notions; In Section 3, we discuss how
to relax barrier certificate conditions, as well how to com-
bine two functions to form a combined barrier certificate,
but neither of them can be used as a barrier certificate sep-
arately; Section 4 is devoted to how to synthesize barrier
certificates according to relaxed conditions discussed above
based on SDP; Section 5 provides some case studies as well
as experimental results. Finally, we conclude this paper in
Section 6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce some basic notions, and
then explain the basic idea of barrier certificates.
In what follows, we use R to stand for the set of reals, Cω[Rn]
for the set of analytic function from Rn to R.
2.1 Basic notions
An autonomous continuous dynamical system (CDS) is rep-
resented by a differential equation of the form
x˙ = f(x) (1)
where x ∈ Rn, and f is a vector function, called field vector,
whose components are in Cω[Rn], and satisfy local Lipschitz
condition1. In the context of HSs, a CDS is normally
equipped with a domain D ⊆ Rn defining its state space
and an initial set of states Ξ.
In this paper, we use hybrid automata [1] to model HSs,
more models of HSs can be found in [28].
Definition 1 (Hybrid Automata). A hybrid automa-
ton (HA) is a system H =̂ (Q,X, f,D, E,G,R,Ξ), where
• Q = {q1, . . . , qm} is a finite set of discrete states (or
modes);
• X = {x1, . . . , xn} is a finite set of continuous state
variables, with x = (x1, . . . , xn) ranging over R
n;
• f : Q → (Rn → Rn) assigns to each mode q ∈ Q a
locally Lipschitz continuous vector field fq;
• D assigns to each mode q ∈ Q a mode domain Dq ⊆
R
n;
• E ⊆ Q×Q is a finite set of discrete transitions;
• G assigns to each transition e ∈ E a switching guard
Ge ⊆ R
n;
• R assigns to each transition e ∈ E a reset function Re:
R
n → Rn;
• Ξ assigns to each q ∈ Q a set of initial states Ξq ⊆ R
n.
For ease of presentation, we make the following assumptions:
• for all q ∈ Q, fq is a polynomial vector function, so it
satisfies local Lipschitz condition, and thus the exis-
tence and uniqueness of solutions to x˙ = fq is guaran-
teed;
1Local Lipschitz condition guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of the solution of (1) from any initial x0.
• for all q ∈ Q and all e ∈ E, Ξq is a semi-algebraic set,
Dq and Ge are closed semi-algebraic sets
2.
Given an HA H, a safety requirement S of H assigns to each
mode q ∈ Q a safe region Sq ⊆ R
n, i.e. S =
⋃
q∈Q({q}×Sq).
Dually, Su =
⋃
q∈Q({q}×(Dq−Sq)) is called unsafe set. The
reachable set of H, denoted by RH, consists of those (q,x)
for which there exists a finite sequence
(q0,x0), (q1,x1), . . . , (ql,xl)
s.t. (q0,x0) ∈ ΞH, (ql,xl) = (q,x), and for any 0 ≤ i ≤ l−1,
one of the following two conditions holds:
• (Discrete Jump): e = (qi, qi+1) ∈ E, xi ∈ Ge and
xi+1 = Re(xi); or
• (Continuous Evolution): qi = qi+1, and there exists a
δ ≥ 0 s.t. the solution x(xi; t) to x˙ = fqi satisfies
– x(xi; t) ∈ Dqi for all t ∈ [0, δ]; and
– x(xi; δ) = xi+1 .
2.2 Barrier certificates
Given an HS H and a safety property S (dually, an unsafe
set Su), the problem we considered is if RH ⊆ S (dually,
RH ∩S
u = ∅). Obviously, it is equivalent to ∀q ∈ Q.RH↾q⊆
Sq (dually, ∀q ∈ Q.RH ↾q ∩S
u
q = ∅), where RH ↾q stands
for all continuous states of RH projecting onto q. For this
problem on CDSs, Prajna et al in [19, 20] used the idea of
Lyapunov functions for stability analysis in control theory to
separate safe states from unsafe states by a barrier function
with convexity, called barrier certificate. According to their
definition, a barrier function ϕ(x) ∈ Cω[Rn] satisfies the
following conditions:
i) ϕ(x) ≤ 0 for any point x ∈ Ξq ;
ii) ϕ(x) > 0 for any point x ∈ Suq ; and
iii) ∀x ∈ Dq .Lfqϕ(x) ≤ 0, where Lfqϕ(x) =
∂ϕ
∂x
fq(x) is the
Lie derivative of ϕ with respect to the vector field fq.
Trivially to see, the existence of a barrier certificate is just
a sufficient condition to guarantee the safety property to be
verified. Hence, using Prajna et al’s approach, one cannot
claim the property does not hold if he/she fails to discover
a polynomial barrier certificate. Actually, as observed in [9]
by Kong et al, if condition iii) is relaxed to the following iii’),
one can synthesize barrier certificates with more expressive-
ness. Certainly, it is more likely to prove a safety property
by using a more expressive barrier certificate, as it gives a
tighter approximation of the reachable set.
iii’) Lfqϕ(x)− γϕ(x) ≤ 0, where γ is a real number.
3. REVISITING BARRIER CERTIFICATE
CONDITIONS
In this section, we investigate how to relax the condition of
barrier certificates in a general way.
2A subset A ⊆ Rn is called semi-algebraic if there is a
quantifier-free polynomial formula ϕ expressed in Tarski’s
algebra s.t. A = {x ∈ Rn | ϕ(x) is true} .
3.1 Relaxed barrier certificate conditions for
CDSs
First of all, we consider how to relax the condition i)-iii) of
barrier certificates given in [19, 20] for CDSs in a general
way. To the end, we need to have a principle to justify when
a relaxed condition of barrier certificates is reasonable. An
obvious principle is:
Principle of Barrier Certificate (PBC): Given a CDS
D equipped with an initial set Ξ0 and an unsafe set S
u,
a barrier certificate should be a real-valued function
ϕ(x) such that ϕ(x) ≤ 0 for any x ∈ RD, and ϕ(x) > 0
for any point x ∈ Su.
Certainly, if there exists such a function ϕ(x), we can assert
that RD ∩ S
u = ∅, and φ(x) ≤ 0 is an invariant. However,
such a principle cannot be effectively checked in general, so
we have to strengthen the condition to make it effectively
checkable, like in [19, 20, 9]. An interesting problem is with
which condition more expressive barrier certificates can be
synthesized, but the condition is still effectively checkable
and satisfies PBC. We answer the problem by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 (General Barrier Condition (GBC)).
Given a CDS D equipped with a domain D, an initial set Ξ0
and an unsafe set Su, if there is a function ϕ(x) ∈ Cω[Rn],
a real function ψ(x) ∈ Cω[R] such that
∀x ∈ Ξ0.ϕ(x) ≤ 0, (2)
∀x ∈ D.Lfϕ(x)− ψ(ϕ(x)) ≤ 0, (3)
∀x ∈ Su.ϕ(x) > 0, (4)
ξ > 0⇒θ(x(ξ)) ≤ 0, where θ(x(t)) is the solution of{
θ(x(0)) ≤ 0,
Lfθ(x)− ψ(θ(x)) = 0,
(5)
then RD ∩ S
u = ∅.
Proof. Suppose x0 ∈ Ξ0 and x(t) is the corresponding
solution of (1) starting from x0. Our goal is to prove that
for any function ϕ(x(t)) satisfying (2)-(5), then
∀ξ ≥ 0.ϕ(x(ξ)) ≤ 0. (6)
Let g(x) = Lfϕ(x)− ψ(ϕ(x)), then by (3)
∀x ∈ Rn.g(x) ≤ 0 (7)
Since dϕ(x(t))
dt
= ∂ϕ
∂x
dx
dt
= ∂ϕ
∂x
f(x) = Lfϕ(x), we have{
dϕ(x(t))
dt
− ψ(ϕ(x(t)))− g(x(t)) = 0
ϕ(x(0)) = ϕ(x0)
(8)
Assume ϕ(x(ξ)) > 0, for some ξ > 0. Let θ(x(t)) be a
function with {
dθ(x(t))
dt
− ψ(θ(x(t))) = 0
θ(x(0)) = ϕ(x0)
(9)
Let Θ = {ξ | ϕ(x(ξ)) > θ(x(ξ)), ξ ≥ 0}. By (5), ∀ξ >
0.θ(x(ξ)) ≤ 0. Θ is nonempty since the assumption. So
there is a number µ s.t. µ = inf(Θ). Obviously, ϕ(x(t)),
θ(x(t)), g(x(t)), dϕ(x(t))
dt
and dθ(x(t))
dt
are analytic functions
w.r.t. t. Thus ϕ(x(µ)) = θ(x(µ)). If g(x(µ)) < 0, then
dϕ(x(t))
dt
|t=µ <
dθ(x(t))
dt
|t=µ. Hence, ∃ν.ν > µ ∧ ∀ξ ∈ (µ, ν).
dϕ(x(t))
dt
|t=ξ <
dθ(x(t))
dt
|t=ξ. Thus, ∀ξ ∈ (µ, ν).ϕ(x(ξ)) <
θ(x(ξ)), which contradicts to the definition of µ. So g(x(µ)) =
0 and dϕ(x(t))
dt
|t=µ =
dθ(x(t))
dt
|t=µ. If there is a k > 1 s.t.
dkϕ(x(t))
dtk
|t=µ <
dkθ(x(t))
dtk
|t=µ, and ∀i < k,
diϕ(x(t))
dti
|t=µ =
diθ(x(t))
dti
|t=µ, then there is ν1 > µ s.t. ϕ(x(ξ)) < θ(x(ξ))
for any ξ ∈ (µ, ν1), which contradicts to the definition of
µ. If ∀k > 1. d
kϕ(x(t))
dtk
|t=µ =
dkθ(x(t))
dtk
|t=µ, then ϕ(x(ξ)) =
θ(x(ξ)) for any ξ ∈ R+, since ϕ, θ are analytic functions.
So, the claim has been proved. Suppose for some k > 1,
dkϕ(x(t))
dtk
|t=µ >
dkθ(x(t))
dtk
|t=µ and ∀i < k.
diϕ(x(t))
dti
|t=µ =
diθ(x(t))
dti
|t=µ. For all i < k, we simultaneously compute
the ith derivatives of the two sides of the first formulas of
(8) and (9), and obtain d
iψ(ϕ(x(t)))
dti
|t=µ =
diψ(θ(x(t)))
dti
|t=µ,
dig(x(t))
dti
|t=µ = 0 for i < k − 1, and
dk−1g(x(t))
dtk−1
|t=µ > 0.
Thus, there is an δ > µ s.t. ∀ξ ∈ (µ, δ).g(x(ξ)) > 0, which
contradicts to the definition of g(x). This completes the
proof.
From now on, we call ϕ in Theorem 1 a barrier certificate of
D.
Remark 1. • The application of Theorem 1 includes
the following two steps: i) look for a function ψ which
satisfies condition (5); ii) similar to the work in [9],
synthesize barrier certificate according to the resulted
conditions of (2)-(4) by instantiating ψ with the func-
tion obtained in the first step.
• All barrier certificates that can be synthesized using the
existing approaches can also be synthesized according
to these conditions by instantiating ψ to some specific
functions satisfying condition (5). For instance, con-
vex condition in [20] and differential invariant in [17]
correspond to ψ(ϕ) = 0, while exponential condition in
[9] corresponds to ψ(ϕ) = αϕ, where α ∈ R.
The following lemma indicates that we can find a class of
functions ψ different from existing ones, satisfying condition
(5). Thus, from which we can construct a class of relaxed
conditions of barrier certificates by GBC, that can be used
to generate barrier certificates with different expressiveness.
Lemma 1. If {
∂θ
∂t
− αθ − βθ2 = 0,
θ(0) ≤ 0,
(10)
where α < 0, β ∈ R, then ∀ξ > 0. θ(ξ) ≤ 0.
Proof. If β ≤ 0, then from (10) we have
∂θ
∂t
− αθ = βθ2 ≤ 0 (11)
So, the claim is guaranteed by Theorem 1 in [9].
Now, suppose β > 0. Let λ ∈ R with βλ = α, and θ0 = θ(0),
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Figure 1: Solutions of (10) with θ0 = −1 on different
values of α, β.
then
∂θ
∂t
= αθ + βθ2
⇒
∂θ
αθ + βθ2
= ∂t
⇒
dθ
θ(λ+ θ)
= βdt
⇒
1
λ
(
dθ
θ
−
dθ
λ+ θ
) = βdt
⇒ ln
θ
λ+ θ
= λβt+ c0 = αt+ c0
⇒
θ
λ+ θ
= eαt+c0
⇒
θ
λ+ θ
=
θ0
λ+ θ0
e
αt
⇒ θ = (
1
1− θ0
λ+θ0
eαt
− 1)λ (12)
As θ0 ≤ 0, βλ = α, β > 0 and α < 0, we have 0 ≤
θ0
λ+θ0
< 1
and eαξ ≤ 1. So,
0 ≤
θ0
λ+ θ0
e
αξ
< 1,
1
1− θ0
λ+θ0
eαξ
− 1 ≥ 0.
By βλ = α, β > 0 and α < 0, it follows λ < 0. From (12),
we have ∀ξ > 0.θ(ξ) ≤ 0.
Remark 2. One can flexibly choose different relaxed con-
ditions from the above class by setting different values to α
and β according to the following rules, that is illustrated in
Fig. 1:
• if the value of α is smaller, then synthesized barrier
certificates by the resulted condition from GBC are
more expressive, and vice versa;
• if the value of β is greater, then synthesized barrier
certificates are more expressive, and vice versa.
The following example clearly indicates that one can synthe-
size some interesting barrier certificates with some relaxed
conditions from the above class, which cannot be discovered
using the existing approaches.
Example 1. Consider a CDS D1 as follows:{
x˙1 = x
2
1 − 2x1 + x2,
x˙2 = x1 + x
2
2 − 2x2,
with Ξ0 = {(x1, x2) | 0.01 − x
2
1 − x
2
2 ≥ 0}, S
u = {(x1, x2) |
x21 + x
2
2 − 0.25 ≥ 0}
By Theorem 1, we can check that ϕ = x21 + x
2
2 − 0.04 is
a barrier certificate w.r.t. ψ(θ) = −θ + 2θ2 as follows: Let
g0 = 0.01−x
2
1−x
2
2, g1 = x
2
1+x
2
2−0.25. Obviously, −ϕ−g0 =
0.03 > 0, ϕ − g1 = 0.21 > 0 and −Lf (ϕ) − ϕ + 2ϕ
2 =
2x4−2x3+4x2y2+2.84x2−4xy+2y4−2y3+2.84y2+0.0432
is an SOS, so the condition of Theorem 1 is satisfied.
On the other hand, we can show that there is no a barrier
certificate ϕ with
textitdeg(ϕ) ≤ 2 that can be synthesized by the condition
given in [9]. Assume there is is a barrier certificate satisfying
the condition of [9] of the form
ϕ = a20x
2
1 + a11x1x2 + a02x
2
2 + a10x1 + a01x2 + a00
w.r.t. ψ(θ) = αθ, where α, a20, a11, a02, a10, a01, a00 ∈ R.
Let L = −Lf (ϕ)+αϕ, so L should be SOS. From Ξ0 and S
u,
it follows that not all of a20, a11, a02 are equal to 0. Suppose
a20 6= 0, then L has a monomial 2a20x
3
1. Consider the value
of L over the set {(ξ, 0) | a20ξ < 0}, it will become negative
when |ξ| becomes large enough. Similarly, we can derive a
contradiction in cases when a11 6= 0 and a02 6= 0. This
means that our claim holds.
3.2 Combined barrier certificates
Given a CDS D equipped with D, Ξ0 and S
u, suppose
ϕ(x) is a barrier certificate satisfying Theorem 1 w.r.t. an-
other function ψ(x). Clearly, {x | ϕ(x) ≤ 0} is an over-
approximation of RD, while {x | ϕ(x) > 0} is an over-
approximation of Su. It is very common that in many
cases we cannot find such a single barrier certificate to over-
approximate the reachable set, but it can be achieved by
combining several functions together. We call the combina-
tion of these functions a combined barrier certificate. Ac-
tually, a similar problem on differential invariants has been
discussed in [17, 4, 24, 13].
Below, we discuss how to combine two functions together to
form a combined barrier certificate. For easing discussion,
let’s fix the aforementioned CDS D.
Lemma 2. {x | χ(x) ≤ 0} is an over approximation of
RD, if
∀x ∈ Ξ0. χ(x) ≤ 0 (13)
∀x ∈ D. Lfχ(x)− ψ(χ(x)) ≤ 0 (14)
∀ξ. ξ > 0⇒θ(x(ξ)) ≤ 0, where θ(x(t)) is the solution of{
Lfθ(x)− ψ(θ(x)) = 0,
θ(x(0)) ≤ 0,
(15)
where χ(x), ψ(x) ∈ Cω[Rn].
Proof. It can be proved similarly to Theorem 1.
Lemma 3. If there are functions ϕ(x), χ(x) ∈ Cω[Rn] with
∀x ∈ Ξ0.χ(x) ≤ 0, ψ(x) ∈ C
ω[R], and a SOS polynomial δ
3 such that
∀x ∈ Ξ0. ϕ(x) ≤ 0 (16)
∀x ∈ D. Lfϕ(x)− ψ(ϕ(x))− δχ(x) ≤ 0 (17)
∀x ∈ Su. ϕ(x) > 0 (18)
∀ξ.ξ > 0⇒θ(x(ξ)) ≤ 0, where θ(x(t)) is the solution of{
Lfθ(x)− ψ(θ(x)) = 0,
θ(x(0)) ≤ 0,
(19)
then for every trajectory τ of D, we have
(∀ξ ≥ 0.χ(τ (ξ)) ≤ 0)⇒ (∀ξ ≥ 0.τ (ξ) 6∈ Su).
Proof. We only need to prove ∀ξ ≥ 0.ϕ(τ (ξ)) ≤ 0.
∀x ∈ Rn. Lfϕ(x)− ψ(ϕ(x))− δχ ≤ 0
⇒∀ξ ≥ 0.
∂ϕ(τ (t))
∂t
|t=ξ − ψ(ϕ(τ (ξ)))− δχ(τ (ξ)) ≤ 0
as Lfϕ(x) =
∂ϕ(τ (t))
∂t
⇒∀ξ ≥ 0.
∂ϕ(τ (t))
∂t
|t=ξ − ψ(ϕ(τ (ξ))) ≤ 0
as ∀ξ ≥ 0. χ(τ (ξ)) ≤ 0.
Thus, by Theorem 1, the claim is trivially true.
Theorem 2. Let χ(x) ∈ Cω[Rn] satisfy (13)-(15). If
there are functions ϕ(x) ∈ Cω[Rn], ψ(x) ∈ Cω[R], and a
SOS polynomial δ, s.t. (16)-(19) hold, then RD ∩ S
u = ∅.
Proof. It is straightforward by Lemmas 2&3.
We will call the pair (χ, φ) a combined barrier certificate.
Clearly, a single barrier certificate defined in Theorem 1 can
be seen as a specific combined barrier certificate by letting
χ = 0. In addition, actually, it is easy to prove that a
combined barrier certificate forms a combined differential
invariant.
Corollary 1. χ ≤ 0 ∧ ϕ ≤ 0 is a differential invariant
(the definition can be found in [17]) of D, which can guar-
antee its safety.
We use the following example to demonstrate the notion of
combined barrier certificates gives more power to the verifi-
cation of CDSs as well as HSs.
Example 2. Consider the following CDS D[
x˙1
x˙2
]
=
[
2x1 − x1x2
2x21 − x2
]
3That is, δ can be represented by f21 + ... + f
2
n, where
f1, . . . , fn are polynomials.
−8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
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0.029751 x8 + 7.8495e−...− 0.067355 = 0
Figure 2: A combined barrier certificate for Example 2
with Ξ0 = {x ∈ R
2 | x21 + (x2 + 2) ≤ 1} and S
u = {x ∈
R
2 | x2 + (x2 − 1)
2 ≤ 0.09}.
To prove its safety, by Theorem 2, we can synthesize a com-
bined barrier certificate (χ,ϕ), see Fig. 2, in which χ(x) = 0
is denoted by the red line and ϕ(x) = 0 is denoted by the
black line (their mathematical representations can be found
in the appendix). In fact, we can prove χ(x) ≤ 0∧ϕ(x) ≤ 0
is indeed a differential invariant according to the definition
given in [17], which can guarantee the unsafe set unreach-
able.
Besides, we can prove that neither of χ(x) nor ϕ(x) is a
barrier certificate in the sense of Theorem 1. Furthermore,
using the same values of α, β and the degree bound as used in
synthesizing the combined barrier certificate (χ(x), ϕ(x)), we
cannot obtain any single barrier certificate by Theorem 1.
3.3 Relaxed barrier certificate conditions for
HSs
As discussed in [9], the principle of the condition of bar-
rier certificates Φ(x) for an HS H = (Q,X, f,D, E,G,R,Ξ)
w.r.t. a given unsafe set Su should satisfy the following
conditions:
• Φ(x) consists of a set of functions {ϕq(x) | q ∈ Q},
each ϕq(x) is a barrier certificate for CDS x˙ = fq
equipped with the domain Dq, initial set Ξq and unsafe
set Suq ;
• all the discrete transitions starting from every mode
q ∈ Q have to be taken into account in the barrier cer-
tificate condition so that Φ(x) can construct a global
inductive invariant of H.
Based on the discussions about barrier certificate conditions
for CDSs as well as the above principle, we can accordingly
revisit the condition of barrier certificates for HSs based on
the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Given an HS H = (Q,X, f,D, E,G,R,Ξ)
and an unsafe set Su, if there exists a set of non-negative
real numbers {ce | e ∈ E}, and a set of functions {ϕq(x) ∈
Cω[Rn] | q ∈ Q} ∪ {ψq(x) ∈ C
ω[R] | q ∈ Q} s.t.
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Ξq .ϕq(x) ≤ 0 (20)
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Dq .Lfqϕq(x)− ψq(ϕq(x)) ≤ 0 (21)
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Suq .ϕq(x) > 0 (22)
∀q ∈ Q∀ξ.ξ > 0⇒ θq(x(ξ)) ≤ 0,
where θq(x(t)) is the solution of{
Lfqθq(x)− ψq(θq(x)) = 0,
θq(x(0)) ≤ 0,
(23)
∀e ∈ E∀x ∈ G(e)∀x′ ∈ R(e)(x).
ceϕS(e)(x)− ϕT (e)(x
′) ≥ 0, (24)
then RH ∩S
u = ∅, where S(e) and T (e) respectively are the
source and target modes of jump e.
Similarly, based on Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we can re-
visit the condition of combined barrier certificates for HSs
as follows:
Theorem 4. Given an HS H = (Q,X, f,D, E,G,R,Ξ)
and an unsafe set Su, if there exists a set of non-negative
real numbers {ce,1, ce,2, ce,3, ce,4 | e ∈ E}, a set of SOS poly-
nomials {δq | q ∈ Q}, and a set of functions {ϕq(x), χq(x) ∈
Cω[Rn] | q ∈ Q} ∪ {ψq,1(x), ψq,2(x) ∈ C
ω[R] | q ∈ Q} s.t.
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Ξq .χq(x) ≤ 0 (25)
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Dq .Lfqχq(x)− ψq,1(χq(x)) ≤ 0 (26)
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Ξq .ϕq(x) ≤ 0 (27)
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Dq .Lfqϕq(x)− ψq,2(ϕq(x))− δqχq ≤ 0 (28)
∀q ∈ Q∀x ∈ Suq .ϕq(x) > 0 (29)
∀q ∈ Q∀ξ.ξ > 0⇒ θq(x(ξ)) ≤ 0,
where θq(x(t)) is the solution of{
Lfqθq(x)− ψq,1(θq(x)) = 0,
θq(x(0)) ≤ 0,
(30)
∀q ∈ Q∀ξ.ξ > 0⇒ θ′q(x(ξ)) ≤ 0,
where θ′q(x(t)) is the solution of{
Lfqθq(x)− ψq,2(θ
′
q(x)) = 0,
θ′q(x(0)) ≤ 0,
(31)
∀e ∈ E∀x ∈ G(e)∀x′ ∈ R(e)(x).
ce,1ϕS(e)(x)− ϕT (e)(x
′) ≥ 0, (32)
∀e ∈ E∀x ∈ G(e)∀x′ ∈ R(e)(x).
ce,2ϕS(e)(x)− χT (e)(x
′) ≥ 0, (33)
∀e ∈ E∀x ∈ G(e)∀x′ ∈ R(e)(x).
ce,3χS(e)(x)− ϕT (e)(x
′) ≥ 0, (34)
∀e ∈ E∀x ∈ G(e)∀x′ ∈ R(e)(x).
ce,4χS(e)(x)− χT (e)(x
′) ≥ 0, (35)
then RH ∩S
u = ∅, where S(e) and T (e) are respectively the
source and target modes of the jump e.
4. DISCOVERING RELAXED BARRIER CER-
TIFICATES BY SDP
Theorems 1&2 (respt. Theorems 3&4) provide relaxed con-
ditions which can guarantee a function (a combination of
two functions) to be a (combined) barrier certificate for a
CDS (resp. an HS), but these theorems do not provide any
constructive method to synthesizing (combined) barrier cer-
tificates. In this section, we discuss how to exploit SDP
techniques [15, 16] to construct (combined) barrier certifi-
cates from these relaxed conditions, which is inspired by
previous work e.g. [8, 19, 20, 26, 9].
Thus, we briefly review SDP first.
4.1 SDP
We use Symn to denote the set of n × n real symmetric
matrices, and deg(f) the highest total degree of f for a given
polynomial f .
Definition 2 (Positive semidefinite matrices). A ma-
trix M ∈ Symn is called positive semidefinite, denoted by
M  0, if xTMx ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Rn.
Definition 3 (Inner product). The inner product of
two matrices A = (aij), B = (bij) ∈ R
n×n, denoted by
〈A,B〉, is defined by Tr(ATB) =
∑n
i,j=1 aijbij.
Definition 4 (Semidefinite programming (SDP)).
The standard (primal) and dual forms of a SDP are respec-
tively given in the following:
p
∗ = inf
X∈Symn
〈C,X〉 s.t. X  0, 〈Aj , X〉 = bj (36)
(j = 1, . . . , m)
d
∗ = sup
y∈Rm
bTy s.t.
m∑
j=1
yjAj + S = C, S  0, (37)
where C,A1, . . . , Am, S ∈ Symn and b ∈ R
m.
There are many efficient algorithms to solve SDP such as
interior-point method. We present a basic path-following
algorithm to solve (36) in Algorithm 1.
Definition 5 (Interior point for SDP).
intFp = {X : 〈Ai, X〉 = bi (i = 1, . . . ,m), X ≻ 0} ,
intFd =
{
(y, S) : S = C −
m∑
i=1
Aiyi ≻ 0
}
,
intF = intFp × intFd.
Obviously, 〈C,X〉 − bTy = 〈X, S〉 ≥ 0 for all (X,y, S) ∈
intF. Especially, we have d∗ ≤ p∗. So the soul of interior-
point method to compute p∗ is to reduce 〈X,S〉 incessantly
and meanwhile guarantee (X,y, S) ∈ intF.
4.2 Symbolic checking
Please be noted that because of the error caused by nu-
meric computation in SDP, in particular, a threshold c upon
which SDP depends, it may happen that the (combined)
Algorithm 1: Interior_Point_Method
input : C, Aj , bj (j = 1, . . . ,m) as in (36) and a
threshold c
output: p∗
1 Given a (X,y, S) ∈ intF with XS = µI ;
/* µ is a positive constant and I is the identity
matrix. */
2 while µ > c do
3 µ = γµ;
/* γ is a fixed positive constant less than one
*/
4 use Newton iteration to solve (X,y, S) ∈ intF with
XS = µI ;
5 end
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Figure 3: A false barrier certificate of Example 2
due to numeric errors
barrier certificates computed by SDP are not real ones, or
some real (combined) certificates satisfying the condition
cannot be computed or are determined as false ones. For
example, considering Example 2, if we encode the condition
derived from Theorem 1 as a SDP, then call SOSTOOLS4
[21], and obtain the output is:
“ feasratio: 1.0000; pinf: 0; dinf: 0; numerr: 0”.
This indicates that the tool does discover a barrier certifi-
cate. However, after showing the result in Fig. 3, it is easy
to find that the black line in Fig. 3 does not satisfy condi-
tion (3), as some vectors cross it into the area which contains
unsafe set.
So, we have to take the numerical error into account when
using these SDP tools. Our experience is:
• larger the size of matrix X is, larger the error due to
SDP, so it is more likely to obtain a false (combined)
barrier certificate;
• higher the degree of undetermined polynomials as pre-
defined templates of barrier certificates is, larger the
error due to SDP;
• one can synthesize combined barrier certificates with
lower degrees by Theorem 2 than by Theorem 1.
It is absolutely necessary to guarantee the soundness of the
approaches to the verification of HSs. But the approach
based on SDP to synthesize (combined) barrier certificates
4SOSTOOLS is of version v2.04 with MATLAB R2011b.
according to these relaxed conditions, may be unsound be-
cause of the error caused by numeric computation. Below,
we advocate to apply symbolic computation techniques to
check if the synthesized (combined) barrier certificates are
real ones, which is hinted by our previous work [3].
Problem 1. For f ∈ R[x], if ∀x ∈ Rn.f(x) ≥ 0 ?
Checking the constraints in Theorems 1&2&3&4 are obvi-
ously instances of Problem 1. A lot of work has been done
on Problem 1. We choose an exact method based on an
improved Cylindrical Algebraic Decomposition(CAD) algo-
rithm [5] for the checking, and call the tool CADpsd in the
experiments, which implements the algorithms in [5]. The
CADpsd returns True when the input polynomial is positive
semidefinite and False otherwise.
Remark 3. One may doubt the efficiency of the above
symbolic checking since the complexity of CAD is O(22
n
) in
general, where n is the number of variables. However, please
note that Problem 1 is a special case of quantifier elimina-
tion. One of the main contributions of [5] is an improved
algorithm for solving Problem 1. Although the improved al-
gorithm cannot be proved with a lower complexity theoreti-
cally, it has been shown that it does avoid many heavy re-
sultant computation. So, in practice, especially in the case
where the number of variables are greater than 2, CADpsd
is much faster than any general CAD tool. Please see [5]
for details. In our experience, CADpsd can finish checking in
few seconds when deg(f) is no larger than 6 and the number
of variables in f is less than 5, which is enough for many
problems.
4.3 Algorithms
We can sketch the basic steps of the algorithm to construct
(combined) barrier certificates using SDP as follows:
Step 1: predefine parametric polynomial templates with a
degree bound as possible candidates of (combined) bar-
rier certificates;
Step 2: derive constraints on the parameters of these para-
metric polynomial templates from the considered re-
laxed barrier condition;
Step 3: reduce all the constraints on the parameters to a
SDP;
Step 4 apply some SDP solver to solve the resulted SDP
and obtain instantiations of these parameters.
In the above procedure, for most of the constraints on pa-
rameters, we only need to consider how to reduce p ≥ 0
(p ≤ 0) to p = δ (−p = δ), where p is a polynomial and δ
is a undetermined SOS polynomial. In the literature, there
is lot of work on this, please refer to [8, 19, 20, 26, 9, 3] for
the detail.
The hardest part is how to reduce the constraints that con-
tain ψ, χ, ψq, ψq,i, or χq, as they may contain the prod-
uct of two or more parametric polynomials after replace-
ment, which result in non-linear expressions on parameters,
that cannot be seen as a SDP any more. For instance, let
ψ = θ+θ2, and θ = ax1+bx2 be a template of barrier certifi-
cates. By Theorem 1, the constraint derived from condition
(3) will contain expression (ax1+ bx2)+ (ax1+ bx2)
2, which
cannot be reduced to a SDP directly.
To address this issue, we explore the iterative approach pro-
posed in [19] which can handle a constraint containing the
product of two parametric polynomials. We demonstrate
the basic idea of the iterative approach by presenting Algo-
rithm 2 based on which for the following problem.
Problem 2. Suppose Ξ0, S
u, f , ψ are given, where ψ sat-
isfies (5), our goal is to find a ϕ which satisfies (2)- (4).
Algorithm 2: Iterative Algorithm for Problem 2
input : Ξ0, S
u, f , ψ(θ) =
∑s
i=0 aiθ
i, where ψ(θ) satisfies
(5)
output: θ′ which satisfies (2)-(4)
1 θ′ = 0;
2 j = 0;
3 while j ≤ s do
4 ψ′ =
∑j
i=0 aiθθ
′i−1;
5 Use a SDP tool to solve the resulted Problem 2 by
replacing ψ with ψ′;
6 Denote the result of the above step by θ′;
7 j = j + 1;
8 end
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate our approach by some ex-
amples.
Example 3 (modify example of [10]). Consider a CDS
D3 as follows: [
x˙1
x˙2
]
=
[
2x1 − x1x2
2x21 − x2
]
with Ξ0 = {x ∈ R
2 | x21 + (x2 + 2) ≤ 1} and S
u = {x ∈
R
2 | x2 + (x2 − 5.2)
2 ≤ 0.81}.
No polynomial barrier certificates can be synthesized using
the existing approaches for the verification of D3, except for
the one in [10] with which a polynomial barrier certificate
ϕ(x) of degree 8 was discovered. By setting α = −4 and
β = 1.5, by the corresponding relaxed condition by GBC, it
is easy to synthesize a polynomial barrier certificate of degree
6, see Fig. 4 (also see the appendix). In contrast, by setting
β = 0, the corresponding resulted relaxed condition is de-
generated to the case considered in [10]. But unfortunately,
we can not synthesize an appropriate barrier certificate from
the conditions, see Fig. 5.
Example 4. Consider the following CDS D4{
x˙1 = x2
x˙2 = 2x1 − x2 − x
2
1x2 − x
3
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Figure 4: α = −4, β = 1.5
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Figure 5: α = −4, β = 0
with Ξ0 = {x ∈ R
2 | (x1 + 1)
2 + (x2 − 2)
2 ≤ 0.16} and
Su = {x ∈ R2 | (x1 − 1)
2 + x22 ≤ 0.04}. Let g0 = 0.16 −
(x1 + 1)
2 − (x2 − 2)
2, g1 = 0.04 − (x1 − 1)
2 − x22. In order
to prove RD4
∩ Su = ∅, according to Theorem 1, using the
above procedure, we can obtain the following polynomials:
ϕ = −0.91253x21 + 0.40176x1x2 + 1.3603x1 + 0.13922x
2
2
−1.0308x2 − 0.27657,
χ = 0.19394x41 + 0.29363x
3
1x2 − 0.1696x
3
1 + 0.091674x
2
1x
2
2
−0.2317x21x2 − 1.3805x
2
1 + 0.056453x1x
3
2 − 0.14904x1x
2
2
+0.096278x1x2 + 1.7932x1 + 0.070488x
4
2 − 0.063002x
3
2
+0.48804x22 − 1.1726x2 − 0.38201
δ = 0.1956x41 + 0.23674x
3
1x2 − 0.13109x
3
1 + 0.14603x
2
1x
2
2
−0.16935x21x2 + 1.0686x
2
1 + 0.35005x1x
3
2 − 0.29307x1x
2
2
−0.5897x1x2 − 1.8943x1 + 0.26073x
4
2 − 0.23047x
3
2
+0.027813x22 + 0.64131x2 + 1.7118,
u1 = 0.47292x
4
1 + 0.03761x
3
1x2 − 0.15676x
3
1 + 0.45935x
2
1x
2
2
+0.13126x21x2 + 0.26007x
2
1 + 0.0766x1x
3
2 − 0.02395x1x
2
2
+0.045239x1x2 + 0.068505x1 + 0.33983x
4
2 + 0.17729x
3
2
+0.4338x22 + 0.054172x2 + 0.37428
u2 = 0.45008x
4
1 + 0.0064431x
3
1x2 − 0.14066x
3
1 + 0.48519x
2
1x
2
2
+0.18081x21x2 + 0.31882x
2
1 + 0.045636x1x
3
2 − 0.030792x1x
2
2
+0.0463x1x2 + 0.022898x1 + 0.3829x
4
2 + 0.24085x
3
2
+0.48187x22 + 0.10909x2 + 0.37734
u3 = 0.5497x
4
1 − 0.035471x
3
1x2 + 0.073809x
3
1 + 0.66023x
2
1x
2
2
−0.085302x21x2 + 0.34888x
2
1 − 0.020016x1x
3
2 + 0.55526x1x
2
2
+0.032773x1x2 − 0.10637x1 + 0.81332x
4
2 − 0.055596x
3
2
+0.49761x22 + 0.25765x2 + 0.93038
ψ1(θ) = ψ2(θ) = −4θ + 2θ
2,
where δ,u1,u2, u3 − χ− u1g0, −Lf (χ) + ψ1(χ), −ϕ− u2g0,
−Lf (ϕ)+ψ2(ϕ)+δχ, ϕ−u2g1 are positive polynomials.
Example 5. Consider an HS with two modes in Fig. 6,
in which the CDSs at q1 and q2 are respectively x˙ = f1(x)
and x˙ = f2(x), where
f1(x) =

x2
−x1 − x3
x1 + (2x2 + 3x3)(1 + x
2
3),
f2(x) =

x2
−x1 − x3
−x1 − 2x2 − 3x3,
Ξq1 = {x ∈ R
3 | x21 + x
2
2 + x
2
3 ≤ 0.01}, Ξq2 = ∅, Dq1 =
x21 + 0.01x
2
2 + 0.01x
2
3 ≤ 1.01, Dq2 = x
2
1 + x
2
2 + x
2
3 ≥ 0.03 ∧
x21 ≤ 5.1
2, g1 = 0.99 ≤ x
2
1 + 0.01x
2
2 + 0.01x
2
3 ≤ 1.01, and
g2 = 0.03 ≤ x
2
1 + x
2
2 + x
2
3 ≤ 0.05. All resets are identity.
The proof obligation is to verify |x1| ≤ 3.2 at q2. To the end,
we synthesize barrier certificates at each mode first (see the
appendix), then we need to verify the following five condi-
tions :
c1 = −ϕ2 − u23g11 − u24g12 ≥ 0,
c2 = −χ2 − u21g11 − u22g12 ≥ 0,
c3 = −Lf (χ2)− 0.2χ2 + χ
2
2 − u41D2 − u41D21 ≥ 0,
c4 = −Lf (ϕ2)− 0.2ϕ2 + ϕ
2
2 − δ2χ2 − u51D2 − u52D21 ≥ 0,
c5 = ϕ2 − U2 − 0.00001 ≥ 0,
q1 q2
g1
g2
Figure 6: An HS with two modes
Exp. cond. Our method
Degree Time(s) Degree Time(s)
Synthesis Symb. checking
E.g. 2 × × 8 36.023 10.766
E.g. 3 8 1.132 6 2.717 0.226
E.g. 4 6 1.516 4 4.658 0.180
E.g. 5 4 1.387 2 4.260 20.472
Table 1: Experimental data.
by SDP. In which, g11 = 1.01 − x
2
1 − 0.01x
2
2 − 0.01x
2
3,
g12 = x
2
1+0.01x
2
2+0.01x
2
3− 0.99, D2 = x
2
1+x
2
2+x
2
3− 0.03,
D21 = 26.01 − x
2
1, U2 = x
2
1 − 10.24, and u21, u22, u23,
u24, u41, u42, u51, u52, δ2 are SOS synthesized in the first
step.
All the experimental results of all examples given in this
paper can be summarised as in Table 1, in which the label
× means that the corresponding method can not obtain a
barrier certificate. All the results listed were computed on a
64-bit Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU 650 @ 3.20GHz with 4GB
RAM memory and Ubuntu 12.04 GNU/Linux.
By comparing with the approach reported in [9] (see Ta-
ble 1), our approach can synthesize more barrier certifi-
cates, in particular, with lower degree, but our approach
takes more time. However, our approach is still very effi-
cient, typically, symbolic checking can make our approach
to avoid unsoundness because of the error due to numeric
computation in SDP.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To summarize, the contributions of this paper include:
• Relaxation of the conditions of barrier certificate in a
general way, so that one can utilize weaker conditions
flexibly to synthesize various kinds of barrier certifi-
cates with more expressiveness, which gives more op-
portunities to verify the considered system.
• A method to combining two functions together to form
a combined barrier certificate in order to prove a safety
property under consideration, whereas neither of them
can be used as a barrier certificate separately.
• An approach to synthesizing certificates according to
the general relaxed conditions by semi-definite pro-
gramming. In particular, we discussed how to apply
symbolic checking to guarantee the soundness of our
approach caused by the error of numeric computation
in SDP.
• Experimental results demonstrating that our approach
can indeed discover more certificates and give more
opportunities to verify an HS under consideration.
For future work, we plan to combine more than two func-
tions to form a combined barrier certificate. In particular,
we are interested in finding more functions ψ satisfying con-
dition (5) and establishing a library for them. In addition, it
is interesting to investigate how to recover the error caused
by the numeric computation in SDP by some symbolic com-
putation techniques.
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APPENDIX
A. THE DETAILS OF EXAMPLES
The polynomials synthesized in Example 2 are:
ϕ = 0.030317x81+6.9115e−05x
7
1x2−3.6889e−05x
7
1+0.090347x
6
1x
2
2−
0.11095x61x2 − 0.75683x
6
1 − 9.0598e − 05x
5
1x
3
2 − 0.00017438x
5
1x
2
2 −
5.4845e − 05x51x2 + 7.291e − 05x
5
1 − 0.30715x
4
1x
4
2 + 1.0445x
4
1x
3
2 −
1.5458x41x
2
2+0.57141x
4
1x2−0.26344x
4
1−6.3369e−05x
3
1x
5
2+0.00010503x
3
1x
4
2+
0.00038237x31x
3
2−0.00036159x
3
1x
2
2−0.00010184x
3
1x2+9.2214e−05x
3
1+
0.03383x21x
6
2+0.33103x
2
1x
5
2−2.9864x
2
1x
4
2+2.0938x
2
1x
3
2−0.12636x
2
1x
2
2+
0.79519x21x2 − 0.62237x
2
1 + 1.4962e − 05x1x
7
2 − 0.00014241x1x
6
2 +
0.00048485x1x
5
2−0.00065416x1x
4
2+0.00014521x1x
3
2+0.00040002x1x
2
2−
0.00031516x1x2+6.343e−05x1−0.0043261x
8
2+0.05803x
7
2−0.29525x
6
2+
0.80728x52 −1.2538x
4
2 +1.2862x
3
2 −0.76567x
2
2 +0.29172x2 −0.072688,
χ = 9.8484x61+0.001271x
5
1x2+13.4422x
4
1x
2
2−31.2496x
4
1x2−85.8767x
4
1−
0.0031705x31x
2
2−0.012227x
3
1x2−0.0042103x
3
1+5.396x
2
1x
4
2−28.4976x
2
1x
3
2−
46.3212x21x
2
2+87.5486x
2
1x2−44.1755x
2
1+0.0049683x1x
2
2−0.0058767x1x2−
0.0020784x1 +0.46783x
6
2 − 4.0071x
5
2 +6.1875x
4
2 +37.296x
3
2 − 100x
2
2 +
2.0932x2 − 12.8904,
δ = 0.014034x81+3.0608e−06x
7
1x2−5.813e−06x
7
1+0.0021473x
6
1x
2
2−
0.013483x61x2−0.0064165x
6
1 +2.5531e−06x
5
1x
3
2+2.7689e−05x
5
1x
2
2−
1.0371e− 05x51x2 − 2.9253e− 06x
5
1 + 0.02322x
4
1x
4
2 − 0.008259x
4
1x
3
2 +
0.0095319x41x
2
2+0.014437x
4
1x2+0.02625x
4
1+1.126e−05x
3
1x
5
2−3.9758e−
05x31x
4
2 +3.4426e− 05x
3
1x
3
2 − 1.2647e− 05x
3
1x
2
2 +8.5785e− 06x
3
1x2 −
5.7495e − 07x31 + 0.00051658x
2
1x
6
2 − 0.010421x
2
1x
5
2 + 0.032928x
2
1x
4
2 −
0.041062x21x
3
2+0.030059x
2
1x
2
2−0.030394x
2
1x2+0.013862x
2
1+5.2631e−
07x1x
7
2 − 4.7302e− 06x1x
6
2 +1.3673e− 05x1x
5
2 − 1.3654e− 05x1x
4
2 +
8.3569e− 07x1x
3
2 − 1.6543e− 06x1x
2
2 +1.3272e− 05x1x2 − 8.3958e−
06x1 + 0.00013121x
8
2 − 0.0015345x
7
2 + 0.0076214x
6
2 − 0.019749x
5
2 +
0.02836x42 − 0.023961x
3
2 + 0.01575x
2
2 − 0.010837x2 + 0.0044092,
u1 = 33.1703x
4
1−0.0080558x
3
1x2−0.014014x
3
1+31.8846x
2
1x
2
2−22.7751x
2
1x2+
33.5594x21+0.002164x1x
3
2−0.0059715x1x
2
2−0.037073x1x2+0.020061x1+
10.479x42 + 6.0815x
3
2 + 19.5851x
2
2 − 18.8795x2 + 24.5699,
u2 = 0.579x
8
1 + 7.0204e− 06x
7
1x2 − 1.8771e− 05x
7
1 + 0.61572x
6
1x
2
2 −
0.43594x61x2 + 0.39633x
6
1 + 4.0635e − 06x
5
1x
3
2 + 5.4444e − 06x
5
1x
2
2 −
9.0679e−06x51x2+4.1779e−05x
5
1+0.5972x
4
1x
4
2−0.446x
4
1x
3
2+0.8667x
4
1x
2
2−
0.48811x41x2 + 0.57967x
4
1 + 2.0738e − 06x
3
1x
5
2 + 4.4963e − 06x
3
1x
4
2 −
3.9037e− 06x31x
3
2 − 1.5008e− 05x
3
1x
2
2 − 6.0762e− 05x
3
1x2 +3.4303e−
05x31 + 0.42761x
2
1x
6
2 − 0.20453x
2
1x
5
2 + 0.45199x
2
1x
4
2 − 0.55762x
2
1x
3
2 +
0.80255x21x
2
2−0.18571x
2
1x2+0.36852x
2
1+5.1943e−06x1x
7
2−5.229e−
06x1x
6
2 +4.0646e− 06x1x
5
2 − 8.2704e− 06x1x
4
2 +1.2324e− 05x1x
3
2 −
3.1593e− 06x1x
2
2 − 8.7493e− 06x1x2 +3.0456e− 06x1 +0.18043x
8
2 +
0.1527x72+0.11373x
6
2+0.090147x
5
2+0.40667x
4
2−0.26137x
3
2+0.68588x
2
2−
0.38649x2 + 0.50807,
u3 = 0.82691x
8
1 + 6.8463e− 06x
7
1x2 +7.824e− 06x
7
1 +0.66339x
6
1x
2
2 +
0.69976x61x2 + 0.71112x
6
1 + 2.8381e − 06x
5
1x
3
2 + 2.1678e − 05x
5
1x
2
2 −
2.269e − 05x51x2 − 2.7155e − 05x
5
1 + 0.67426x
4
1x
4
2 + 0.31337x
4
1x
3
2 +
1.0011x41x
2
2 +0.41117x
4
1x2 +0.94169x
4
1 +5.177e− 06x
3
1x
5
2 +2.4687e−
05x31x
4
2 + 4.9193e− 05x
3
1x
3
2 − 8.5264e− 05x
3
1x
2
2 − 9.261e− 05x
3
1x2 −
0.00018356x31+0.55287x
2
1x
6
2+0.26734x
2
1x
5
2+0.43798x
2
1x
4
2−0.42762x
2
1x
3
2+
0.90269x21x
2
2+0.47337x
2
1x2+0.73082x
2
1+6.4342e−06x1x
7
2+1.7535e−
05x1x
6
2 + 3.191e − 05x1x
5
2 + 2.9182e − 05x1x
4
2 + 7.677e − 05x1x
3
2 +
2.0006e− 05x1x
2
2 − 3.1684e− 05x1x2 − 6.6486e− 06x1 +0.45107x
8
2 −
0.15576x72+0.12208x
6
2−0.29031x
5
2+0.39853x
4
2−0.57126x
3
2+0.29347x
2
2−
0.33244x2 + 0.43254,
ψi(θ) = ψ2(θ) = −4θ + 2θ
2.
The polynomials synthesized in Example 3 are :
ϕ = 9.8484x61+0.001271x
5
1x2+13.4422x
4
1x
2
2−31.2496x
4
1x2−85.8767x
4
1−
0.0031705x31x
2
2−0.012227x
3
1x2−0.0042103x
3
1+5.396x
2
1x
4
2−28.4976x
2
1x
3
2−
46.3212x21x
2
2+87.5486x
2
1x2−44.1755x
2
1+0.0049683x1x
2
2−0.0058767x1x2−
0.0020784x1 +0.46783x
6
2 − 4.0071x
5
2 +6.1875x
4
2 +37.296x
3
2 − 100x
2
2 +
2.0932x2 − 12.8904,
χ = 0, δ = 0, u1 = 0,
u2 = 9.8484x
6
1+0.001271x
5
1x2+13.4422x
4
1x
2
2−31.2496x
4
1x2−85.8767x
4
1−
0.0031705x31x
2
2−0.012227x
3
1x2−0.0042103x
3
1+5.396x
2
1x
4
2−28.4976x
2
1x
3
2−
46.3212x21x
2
2+87.5486x
2
1x2−44.1755x
2
1+0.0049683x1x
2
2−0.0058767x1x2−
0.0020784x1 +0.46783x
6
2 − 4.0071x
5
2 +6.1875x
4
2 +37.296x
3
2 − 100x
2
2 +
2.0932x2 − 12.8904,
u3 = 9.8484x
6
1+0.001271x
5
1x2+13.4422x
4
1x
2
2−31.2496x
4
1x2−85.8767x
4
1−
0.0031705x31x
2
2−0.012227x
3
1x2−0.0042103x
3
1+5.396x
2
1x
4
2−28.4976x
2
1x
3
2−
46.3212x21x
2
2+87.5486x
2
1x2−44.1755x
2
1+0.0049683x1x
2
2−0.0058767x1x2−
0.0020784x1 +0.46783x
6
2 − 4.0071x
5
2 +6.1875x
4
2 +37.296x
3
2 − 100x
2
2 +
2.0932x2 − 12.8904,
ψ1 = 0, ψ2(θ) = −4θ + 1.5θ
2.
The polynomials synthesized in Example 5 are: ϕ2 = 1.6165x21−
0.20569x1x2 +0.19824e− 1x1x3 +0.95436e− 5x1 +0.54446e− 1x
2
2 +
0.69996e− 3x2x3 − 0.16916e− 6x2 +0.9101e− 1x
2
3 +0.1511e− 7x3 −
9.6424
χ2 = 0.89818e−1x
2
1−0.82739e−1x1x2+0.21192e−1x1x3−0.15224e−
8x1 +0.54928e−2x
2
2 +0.84123e−2x2x3 +0.1277e−8x2 +0.35173e−
1x23 + 0.27238e− 9x3 − 5.3973
δ2 = 5.5914x
2
1 − 0.21067x1x2 − 0.24733e− 1x1x3 + 0.87702e− 5x1 +
0.20573x22−0.52174e−1x2x3+0.28769e−6x2+0.22449x
2
3+0.87144e−
7x3 + 0.29484
u21 = 1.5356x
2
1 + 0.13731e− 1x1x2 − 0.19249e− 2x1x3 − 0.10079e−
6x1 + 0.66295x
2
2 − 0.64549e− 1x2x3 − 0.63485e− 7x2 + 0.39611x
2
3 −
0.66953e− 8x3 + 2.6867
u22 = 0.73288x
2
1 − 0.22775e−2x1x2 +0.27401e− 2x1x3 − 0.51154e−
7x1 + 0.59472x
2
2 − 0.55279e− 1x2x3 − 0.48206e− 7x2 + 0.34978x
2
3 −
0.74061e− 8x3 + 0.60632
u23 = 2.0821x
2
1 + 0.40593e − 1x1x2 − 0.50855e− 2x1x3 − 0.8427e −
4x1 + 0.61146x
2
2 − 0.90046e− 2x2x3 − 0.83808e− 5x2 + 0.14389x
2
3 −
0.1148e− 5x3 + 4.5124
u24 = 1.0004x
2
1 + 0.1131e − 1x1x2 − 0.22779e − 2x1x3 − 0.288e −
4x1 +0.517x
2
2−0.80914e−2x2x3 −0.11074e−4x2 +0.83205e−1x
2
3 −
0.82264e− 6x3 + 0.70099
u41 = 0.43056e − 3x
2
1 − 0.29796e − 4x1x2 + 0.10489e − 3x1x3 +
0.59287e − 11x1 + 3.8141e − 6x
2
2 + 0.95752e − 5x2x3 + 0.26518e −
12x2 + 0.39903e− 4x
2
3 + 0.51833e− 12x3 + 0.36e− 2
u42 = 0.56936e − 2x
2
1 + 0.53069e − 2x1x2 + 0.35737e − 2x1x3 −
0.75779e − 10x1 + 0.20039e − 2x
2
2 + 0.26891e − 2x2x3 + 0.29818e −
10x2 + 0.16505e− 2x
2
3 − 0.16159e− 10x3 + 0.52902
u51 = 0.28447e−1x
2
1−0.28324e−2x1x2−0.37952e−3x1x3+0.125e−
6x1+0.52784e−3x
2
2−0.86183e−4x2x3−0.63026e−8x2+0.88611e−
4x23 − 0.86257e− 9x3 + 0.11143e− 1
u52 = 0.12129x
2
1 − 0.13405e− 1x1x2 − 0.15008e−2x1x3 − 0.82285e−
6x1+0.47845e−2x
2
2−0.73624e−3x2x3−0.20348e−6x2+0.52816e−
3x23 + 0.21178e− 7x3 + 3.5079
